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IN THE SUPRE~m COURT OF THE 
ST:\TE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
Case No. 16914 
ROBERT KIRK ECHEVARRIETA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charge~ with having knowingly and 
intentionally produced marijuana, a Schedule I controlled 
substance, in violation of Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted-in the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District of Utah County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding, on the 16th day 
of January, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant respectfully requests that, on the 
basis of the grounds herein set forth, his conviction be 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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reversed and that he be released from the custody of the 
State of Utah forthwith. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 9, 1979, the appellant and his wife 
were staying at their parents' home in Goshen, Utah. (Trial 
Record 61:21). At the same time, they were visiting the 
house of appellant's older brother in Santaquin in order 
to check on the house and care for the yard while the 
brother was out of town. ( T. R. 6 2 : l) . Anothe-r, younger 
brother of the appellant also had access to the Santaquin 
house and yard at the time. 
The house belonging to appellant's older brother 
is situated on a large lot on the corner of two roads, on 
the northwest corner of the intersection. The house is 
separated from the roads on its south and east by large 
trees and yards and various types of shrubbery. The front 
door is on the east side of the house, with a walkway 
leading from the sidewalk to the door. The carport and 
driveway are also on the east side, toward the north end 
of the house. 
The kitchen door is on the southwest corner of the 
house, where there is a kind of private driveway leading 
from the door to the road on the south of the house. Just 
east of the kitchen door is a living room window on the 
south side of the house, and west of the south driveway 
and kitchen door is the back yard. 
-2-
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On the afternoon of the 9th of October, 1 ~tr. 
Walter Smith of Santaquin went to the house to read the 
water meter. He did not know the location of :je meter 
beforehand and had to search the yard for it. Coming from 
the neighboring house on the north of the house in question, 
he left the public sidewalk on the east side of the house 
and entered the front yard. Not finding the meter on the 
east side of the house, he angled across the corner of the 
house to the south side of the yard and found the meter 
located on the property line near the road on the south 
edge of the yard, about 50 feet from the house. (Hearing 
Record 11:26). 
While in the yard, Mr. Smith observed the following: 
two flower pots in the living room window containing single 
plants of a height between one, and one and a half inches 
tall (H.R.12:15, 28:5), a large metal washtub near the 
kitchen door containing several plants of heights between 
two and six inches (H.R.13:28), and two white five-gallon 
plastic buckets in the back yard, west of the private 
driveway, each containing two to four plants between five 
and six inches tall (H.R.28:26, 29:28). Mr. Smith recog-
nized the plants from a course that he had taken in law 
enforcement, and concluded that they were marijuana. 
Within half an hour, Mr. Smith had notified Officer 
Gary McGiven who went directly to the property, without a 
search warrant, to confirm the report. Officer McGiven 
-3-
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walked directly onto the property and examined the plants 
close-up. He admitted that the weeds on the property were 
about a foot higher than the edge of the metal tub, and 
that the plants extended only a couple inches over the edge 
of the tub. (H.R.27:12, 16:14). The weeds in the back 
yard were also higher than the tops of the five-gallon 
buckets (H.R.27:13). As to the plants in the window, 
Officer McGiven testified that he had to get right next to 
them to see what they were (H.R.28:11). In short, none of 
the plants could be identified from the street or from any 
other public property (H.R.26:9-16, 16:14). The officer 
did not in fact attempt to observe them from a public 
place (H.R.24:26) and although he could have gotten a 
search warrant that day, he failed to do so but rather· 
went directly onto the property to search for the reported 
plants (H.R.24:2, 24:30). 
Having concluded that the plants were marijuana, 
the officer established surveillance from behind a fence 
on the north end of the back yard. The metal tub had been 
moved to a position about ten feet inside that fence 
(H.R.37:12) so that from the fence the officer could see 
the tub ten feet away and the two plastic buckets at the 
south end of the yard about 90 feet away (H.R.23:11). It 
was not shown who had moved the tub. At about 6:00 p.m. 
on the 12th, the fourth day of the surveillance, the 
officer observed the appellant come out of the house and 
-4-
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water the plants in the two plastic buckets 90 feet away 
(H.R.35:7, T.R.20:7, 22:16). Appellant was never observed 
watering or caring in any way for any of the other plants, 
nor taking care of the plants in the buckets on any other 
occasion (T.R.22:22, 23:5). He was only seen watering 
those in the buckets, and was never observed near the other 
plants. Appellant's brother (not the owner of the house 
but a younger brother) however, was observed near the metal 
tub, apparently checking the plants. 
Having observed the appellant watering the plants 
in the buckets, Officer McGiven and others arrested the 
appellant and his wife. They had no warrant to arrest 
appellant or to search the property, but nonetheless took 
him into custody and seized all the plants in the yard 
which appeared to be marijuana (H.R.31:24-27). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INITIAL SEARCH BY THE POLICE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH A.1'1.ENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION, AND ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF 
THAT SEARCH SHOULD F..AVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
Based upon the facts of the case outlined above, 
appellant made a motion to suppress all evidence of the 
marijuana plants found growing at the Santaquin house. 
That motion was denied after a hearing held immediately 
before appellant's trial. Appellant submits that the denial 
of that motion was error and that all such evidence should 
have been suppressed. Since the evidence was crucial to 
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the State's case, its erroneous admission is grounds for 
reversal. 
The first issue to resolve is whether there was in 
fact a search or seizure for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment. The courts make a distinction between those 
cases in which, before such an observation is possible, the 
officer intrudes upon the protected privacy of the suspect. 
In the first instance, no search or seizure occurs for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment; but in the second, the 
intrusion of the officer upon the constitutionally protected 
privacy of the suspect invokes the requirements of the 
Amendment that such intrusion be authorized by a warrant 
or be in conformance with certain well-defined exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. 
The scope of protection offered by the Fourth Amend-
ment is delineated in the case of Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 14 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). There, 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection. [Citation] But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected. 88 S.Ct. at 511. [Emphasis 
added] . 
Thus, if a person exposes the evidence or fruits of a crime 
to the public, he very likely forfeits the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment because the officer's observation of 
-6-
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that evidence would not constitute a "search" under t-_:~~e 
Fourth Amendment. However, if the person has sought to 
protect his property from public scrutiny, any observation 
of that property would have to meet the requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment. The officer would either have to 
obtain a warrant to search or be able to justify his search 
under one of the limited exceptions to the warrant require-
ment. 
A number of cases have applied the Katz rule to 
facts very similar to those of this case. Although Katz 
itself dealt with electronic surveillance, its rationale 
applies equally well to searches of the private property 
of citizens. In such cases, the court seeks to determine 
whether the accused held a "reasonable expection of privacy" 
in his property at the time when the police conducted a 
search. 
For example, in Lorenzana v. Superior Court of Los 
.::rngeles County, 9 Cal.3d 626, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 
33 (Calif. 1973), in which the California Supreme Court 
overruled several prior California cases such as People v. 
Bradley, 81 Cal. Rptr. 459, 460 P.2d 129 {1969), the Court 
considered a similar case in which the police received 
information that a suspect was selling drugs at his home. 
Officers oroceeded to the address without first obtaining Jo: 
a warrant either to search the house or to arrest the sus-
pect. The house was a single family home, set back about 
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70 feet from the sidewalk, with entrances on the west side 
and the rear. On the east side of the house there were no 
doors or pathways but there was a strip of grass-and-dirt-
covered ground 6 to 10 feet wide separating the side of 
the house from the edge of the driveway of the house next 
door. The officers, rather than approach the house using 
the paths to the front door, walked up the neighbor's 
driveway and crossed over this strip of ground to a window 
on the east side of the house. From the driveway, they 
could see nothing through the window. But from a position 
about six inches from the window, they could see into the 
house through a space in the curtains. It was necessary 
to cross the ground and be within six inches of the window 
to observe anything inside. From that position, where they 
had no permission from the defendant to be, they could see 
the defendant inside involved in a heroin transaction. 
On the basis of that evidence, the defendant was arrested 
and convicted. 
In deciding whether the Fourth Amendment requirements 
were applicable to the officers in that case, the court 
applied the test of Katz. Under the facts, the court framed 
the issue as whether the police were making their observa-
tions from a position on a part of the house's surrounding 
property which was in some manner expressly or impliedly 
opened to the public and to public use: 
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These cases clearly demonstrate the salutarv 
rule of law that observations of things in · 
plain sight made from a place where a police 
officer has a right to be do not amount to a 
search in the constitutional sense. On the 
other hand when observations are made from a 
position to which the officer has not been 
ex ressly or im liedl invited, the intrusion 
is unlaw ul unless executed pursuant to a warrant 
or one of the established exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. 511 P.2d at 39. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Finding that the officer in the case did not have express 
invitation to cross the defendant's property to a position 
six inches from his window, the court considered whether 
such invitation could be implied from any facts which 
might indicate that the property was opened to public use 
generally. Examining the physical characteristics of the 
house and yard, the court stated: 
None of this evidence could support a finding 
that normal approach to the Lorenzana home 
would lead the public to within six inches of 
the window in question .... The record reveals 
no substantial evidence supporting a conclusion 
that a normal access route to either the 
Lorenzana home or the house behind it on the 
same lot would lead to a point within a scant 
six inches from the window through which the 
officers made their observations; thus, those 
observations were made from a position where 
the officers had no right to be. Id. at 40-41 
Thus, the court reasoned that where a party has 
developed his property in such a way that a normal access 
route to the house is provided and clearly defined, though 
other routes may be possible and other areas of the 
property accessible to the public in the sense that there 
are no fences or barriers erected to prevent passage, 
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that party has indicated his intention to allow public 
access by the normal route but to preserve his privacy in 
all other areas. Police officers intruding in those other 
~ 
areas, away from the normal access route, must meet the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The court explained: 
the generic Katz rule permits the resident 
of a house to rely justifiably upon the privacy 
of the surrounding areas as a protection from 
the peering of the officers unless such resi-
dence is "exposed" to that intrusion by the 
existence of public pathways or other invitation 
to the public to enter upon property. This 
justifiable reliance on the privacy of the non-
common portion of the property surrounding one's 
residence thus leads to the particular rule 
that searches conducted without a warrant from 
such parts of the property always are uncon-
stitutional unless an exception to the warrant 
requirement applies. Id. at (2. 
Similar conclusions were reached in the cases of Jenkins 
v. State, 248 So.2d 758, (Ct.Crim.App.Alab. 1971) and 
Olivera v. State, 315 So.2d 487 (Dist.Ct.App.Fla. 1975). 
The fact that the evidence in this case was found 
lying in the yard by officers walking around the yard 
rather than by loo~ing through drawn curtains or standing 
only inches away from the house itself is not significant. 
In Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968), 
officers investigating the theft of trees from federal 
lands went to the residenc~ of the defendant and found a 
stockpile of trees next to his home, among some standing 
trees and in a pile only 20 to 35 feet from the building 
and a mere 5 feet from a public parking place. The defen-
dant's home itself was a resort lodge, open to the public, 
-10-
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and the primary issue in the case was whether the area 
where the trees were piled was property which the defendant 
sought to protect as private .. The pile was in plain view 
of the parking lot, but in order to determine if the trees 
were stolen, the officers had to step onto the property 
and examine the trees close up. The court held that though 
the pile of trees was on property which was unenclosed by 
any kind of fence and was bordered only by the curb of the 
parking lot, it was still apparently meant to be protected 
as private by the defendant, since there were no paths onto 
that part of the property from any public area which could 
be considered normal approaches to the residence. The 
court concluded: 
A more appropriate test in determining if a 
search and seizure adjacent to a house is con-
stitutionally forbidden is whether it consti-
tutes an intrusion upon what the resident seeks 
to preserve as private even in an area which, 
although adjacent to his house, is accessible 
to the public. · .•. There can be no doubt that 
Wattenburg, in placing the stockpile this close 
to his place of residence, sought to protect 
it from this kind of government intrusion. 
388 F.2d at 857. 
Similarly, in Black v. State, 168 S.E.2d 916 (Ct. 
App.Ga. 1969), the court held that entry upon a person's 
:ront yard for the purpose of examining possibly stolen 
property was unlawful. There, the police suspected that 
the resident of a home had stolen an automobile engine. 
rlrriving at the home without a warrant to search or arrest, 
-11-
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they saw a motor hanging from a tree in the front yard, but 
were unable to see from the path to the front door whether 
there were marks on the motor which would identify it as 
the stolen one. Walking over to the tree, they examined 
the motor close up and determined that it was stolen. The 
court on appeal, however, determined that this intrusion 
violated the Fourth Amendment, since, althoug~ the area 
was unenclosed, it was a part of the property which the 
suspect meant to preserve as private. As soon as the police 
stepped off the path to the front door, which was the 
normal access route to the entrance of the home, they were 
conunitting an unlawful intrusion. See also State v. 
Buchanan, 4 32 S. W. 2d 3 42 (Mo. 19 6 8) and Durham v .· State, 
471 S.W.2d 527 (Ark. 1971). 
In the present case, there was clearly sufficient 
evidence brought out at the suppression hearing to establish 
that the evidence of the presence of marijuana plants on 
the property in question was obtained as a result of a 
search that violated the Fourth Amendment. Here, the only 
normal and apparent public approaches to the entrance of 
the Santaquin house were the carport driveway on the north-
east corner of the house and the path leading from the 
east road to the front door, also on the east side of the 
house. Neither of these normal public access routes was 
anywhere near the window where the potted plants were 
observed, nor were either of the routes close to the kitchen 
-12-
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door, near which the metal tub was locat2·1. Both the 
window and the kitchen door were in the south side of the 
house, completely opposite and isolated from the normal 
approaches to the public entrance of the house. There was 
certainly no express or implied invitation to the public 
to enter the back yard, where the plastic buckets were 
located. 
Further, it is clear that the area where the plants 
were found was an area which the owner of the house sought 
to preserve as private. As stated, that side of the house 
was far from the public approaches to the main entrance. 
That side of the house faced away from any neighboring 
house, and yet was sufficiently distant from the road that 
it would be impossible for anyone to observe the plants 
from any public property as long as they remained small. 
Even the fact that the water meter was on that side of the 
house does not tend to negate the fact that the owner 
sought to protect his privacy there, since the meter was 
at least 50 feet away from the house, from which distance 
the plants could not be recognized. The presence of a 
makeshift driveway was also not an invitation to public 
access, since it was a private driveway, located in an 
area which was not intended to be a normal, public a?proach 
to the house. 
Because of these facts, when the officer left the 
public street and public sidewalk and entered the property 
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of the appellant to observe the plants, he intruded upon 
an area in which the appellant had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Even though the planters thermselves may have 
been in plain view from the street, the facts show that 
the plants could not be recognized from that distance. 
Since the officer had no warrant to search, and could not 
justify his search on the basis of any exception to the 
warrant requirement, his search was unlawful. All evidence 
of the presence of marijuana, obtained as a result of that 
search, should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed2d 441 (1963). 
II. ALL EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF MARIJUANA EXCEPT THAT· 
RELATING TO THE PLANTS IN THE PLASTIC BUCKETS SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AS IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
During the trial, it was established that the only 
observation which connected the appellant to any of the 
marijuana was the officer's testimony that the appellant 
watered the plants in the two white plastic buckets. 
(T.R.22:22, 23:5). There was no evidence that the appellant 
was connected in any way with the other plants. After 
the presentation of evidence concerning those other plants, 
the appellant therefore moved to exclude such evidence, 
since it constituted evidence which was irrelevant as to 
his offense. That motion was denied. (T.R.52:8-53:15, 
58:14). The appellant respectfully submits that the denial 
of his motion was improper and that the admission of the 
-14-
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evidence of the other plants was highly prejudicial and 
constituted reversible error. 
It is well established that generally where a 
defendant is charged with a specific offense, evidence 
against him will be admitted only if it is relevant to 
that offense. If there is no apparent connection between 
an item of evidence and the offense of the defendant, 
that evidence must be excluded, especially where it might 
prejudice the jury against the defendant. 
In a very similar case, the Supreme Court of 
Oregon held such unconnected evidence to be inadmissible 
and highly prejudicial. In State v. Hall, 523 P.2d 556 
(Ore. 1974), a suspect shared a four-bedroom home with a 
married couple. On the occasion in question, the police 
raided the home to search for drugs and found, among other 
things, 95 grams of marijuana in the couple's bedroom. 
The presence of that marijuana in the home was admitted 
into evidence in the trial of the suspect for possession 
of marijuana, although the suspect argued that it was inad-
rnissible against him. The court reversed his conviction, 
stating: 
On oral argument, the State conceded that the 
95 grams of marijuana found in the west bedroom 
was erroneously admitted. This concession was 
well warranted. The evidence was uncontroverted 
that the west bedroom was occupied by the Spikes. 
Nothing produced at trial indicated that peti-
tioner had any right of access to this room, 
nor that he had actual or constructive possession 
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of the marijuana in that room. This conclusion 
alone requires reversal because we cannot be 
certain that the jury did not rely on this evi-
dence in finding petitioner guilty. 523 P.2d 
at 558. 
Thus, the court held that where there was no evidence 
tending to connect the defendant with the presence of the 
marijuana, its admission was highly prejudicial and required 
reversal .. 
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 330 N.E.2d 502 (App. 
Ct.Mass. 1975), a similar conclusion was reached. There, 
the police had kept a house under surveillance and had 
observed two defendants entering and leaving the house on 
numerous occasions. Executing a search warrant, the police 
met one of the defendants at· the door and found another in 
bed in a bedroom. They further found heroin in the kitchen 
and arrested both the men for possession of heroin. On 
appeal, the court held that where there was no evidence 
that either was owning or renting the home which might 
establish constructive possession, nor any evidence that 
either of them had any form of dominion or control over 
the kitchen area of the house or even of the apartment as 
a whole, there was simply no connection between the sus-
pects and the contraband, and the presence of the heroin 
in the kitchen was not competent evidence against them. 
In People v. Miller, 268 N.E.2d 213 (App.Ct.Ill. 
1971), a court held that evidence of narcotics and para-
phernalia which could not be directly connected with the 
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defendant should have been excluded and its admission 
highly prejudicial and constituted reversible error. 
w.1s 
In 
another case of the same name, P2col-2 v. Miller, 328 P.2d 
506 (Dist.Ct.App.Calif. 1958), a court similarly ordered 
reversal where evidence of the presence of marijuana near 
an individual's apartment was irrelevant and highly preju-
dicial. There, the court explained: 
The court clearly committed error in the 
admission of the marijuana. it was not only 
separated from appellant by space but by time 
as well . . . Nothing was produced in evidence 
to connect appellant with it in any way ... 
Something more than mere suspicion must be 
shown and appellant's connection with this 
marijuana does not rise above the level of 
pure guess and conjecture. * * * The prejudice 
to appellant from the introduction of this 
very large cache of marijuana is clear, and 
this was aggravated by the court's reiterated 
statement that the jury "has a right to con-
sider it." 
In the present case, there was similarly no evidence 
tending to connect the appellant with any plants other than 
those in the white plastic buckets. He was never seen near 
any of the other plants. It is true that the plants in the 
tub were moved, but the conclusion that the appellant 
moved them is pure guesswork and mere conjecture, not suf-
ficient to make those plants relevant to appellant's 
alleged offense. The fact that appellant's younger brother, 
one not living at that home, was in fact seen near the tub 
of plants serves to further add to the uncertain nature of 
any connection between appellant and those plants, since 
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it could easily have been the brother who moved the tub. 
Furthermore, the fact that the appellant had some 
access to the yard and to the house is not sufficient to 
establish the necessary connection between him and the 
plants, as illustrated in the cases above~ Exclusive con-
trol of a premises may serve to create a presumption that 
the person in control has possession of all objects on the 
premises, but where there is joint possession, there must 
be further circumstances establishing beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the suspect exercised some form of dominion or 
control over the object. State v. Wiley, 522 P.2d 281 
(Mo. 1975). Here, if the appellant had possession of the 
premises at all, it was shared with his wife, his younger 
brother who was present at the same time, and with his 
older brother, the owner of the house. In order for his 
access to the premises to serve as a justification for 
admitting evidence of the plants, there would have to be 
other circumstances connecting him with them. In this case, 
there were simply no facts connecting appellant with these 
other plants, and the admission of evidence concerning 
them was erroneous. 
That the admission of evidence concerning the 
plants in the metal tub was prejudicial to the appellant 
and requires reversal is clear from the fact that the only 
plants positively identified as marijuana at the trial 
were plants from the metal tub. (T.R.26:4-9). There was 
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no direct testimony by any expert witness that the plants 
which the appellant actually was seen watering were mari-
juana plants. Thus, if the plants in the tub had been 
~xcluded as required b~ the law, there would have been 
insufficient evidence to convict the appellant; their 
admission therefore was highly prejudicial and requires 
reversal. 
Even if the court could have been justified in 
finding a connection between the appellant and the other 
plants, their admission would still have been improper 
under the general rule that evidence of a defendant's other 
crimes or wrongful acts is inadmissible for the purpose of 
degrading his character or to establish his propensity to 
commit the crime in question. If the appellant were shown 
to be connected to the other plants, his connection with 
them could only establish that, in regards to them, he was 
in unlawful possession of them. But evidence of his 
unlawful possession of other plants, constituting alle-
gations of other crimes, would be excluded under Rules 47 
and 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978), 
those rules are summarized as follows: 
The rules of evidence require rejection of 
evidence of specific behavior to prove a 
character trait except evidence of conviction 
of crime. The rule, of course, is different 
where the evidence of other crimes or civil 
wrongs is relevant to prove some other material 
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fact such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity. 
In State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975), the rule 
is stated thus: 
The general rule is that in a criminal case 
evidence which shows or tends to show that 
the defendant had committed another crime in 
addition to that for which he is on trial is 
inadmissible. However, an exception to the rule 
is that evidence of another crime is admissible 
when it tends to establish motive; intent; 
absence of mistake or accident; or to show a 
common scheme or plan embracing commission of 
similar crimes so related to each other that 
the proof of one tends to establish the crime 
for which the defendant is on trial. 
In the present case, where the appellant was charged 
with the cultivation of the plants in the white buckets but 
evidence was introduced which tended to show his possession 
of other plants, none of the exceptions to the general rule 
of inadmissibility are applicable. Here, the presence of 
the other plants adds nothing to the establishment of the 
appellant 1 s motive, intent, or knowledge, because there was 
nothing in the evidence which tended to show that he had 
any motive, intent, or knowledge or undertook any act of 
cultivation with respect to those other plants. No infer-
ence as to motive, intent, or knowledge arises from his 
alleged possession of the other plants which does not arise 
from his watering of the plants in the white buckets. And 
since the only evidence of his motive, intent, or knowledge 
as to the plants in the white buckets arose from a statutory 
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presumption based upon his cultivation, Section 58-37-8(11) 
U.C.A., the additional evidence of the other plants there-
fore added nothing. 
Nor does the presence of the other pl3nts establish 
a plan which would tend to verify his cultivation of the 
plants in the white buckets, since absent a showing that 
he watered or did any other act constituting "cultivation'' 
of any other plants, there would be no inference from his 
connection with the other plants which would support the 
charge of cultivation of the plants in the white buckets. 
Certainly, proof of some connection between him and the 
other plants, or of his possession of those plants, does 
not tend to prove the fact that he watered the plants in 
the white buckets, for which he is charged. 
Therefore, since the evidence of the other plants 
could be offered only if he was in possession of those plants, 
and such evidence would be evidence only of other crimes of 
the appellant, it would be inadmissible under the general 
rule. As such evidence does not fit any of the adopted 
exceptions in this case, it should have been excluded. 
III. FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA 
WAS ERROR. 
During the trial, appellant requested that the court 
deliver to the jury two instructions, one detailing the 
elements of the offense of simple possession of marijuana 
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as prohibited by Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), U.C.A., and the 
other instructing the jury that it could find the defen-
dant guilty of the lesser included offense of simple 
possession of marijuana. Both these instructions were 
refused by the court. Appellant respectfully submits that 
such refusal was erroneous, since simple possession of 
marijuana is a lesser included offense of manufacture of 
marijuana, and since in this case the jury may have found 
insufficient evidence on the greater charge but sufficient 
evidence on the lesser charge. 
Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i) provides: 
Except as authorized by this act, it shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly and inten-
tionally: 
(i) To produce, manufacture,·or dispense, or to 
possess with intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit 
substance. 
Section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) provides: 
It shall be unlawful: 
(i) For any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance . 
Violation of the former provision, with respect to marijuana, 
carries a felony sentence. Violation of the latter, with 
respect to marijuana, a misdemeanor sentence, for first 
offenses. The latter is clearly a lesser offense than the 
former. The issue here is whether it is an included offense. 
An offense is included in another if there is no 
element of the former which is not also an element of the 
latter. On the basis of the statutes and the usual definitions 
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of the terms therein, it is clear that simple possession 
of marijuana includes no element which is not 3lso an ele-
ment of production of marijuana. The mental state required 
for each is the same. As to the substantive elements of 
each, Section 58-37-2 defines "possession" as including 
"joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, 
swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances." It defines 
"production" as "manufacturing, planting, cultivation, 
growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance," and 
"manufacture" as "production, preparation, propagation, 
compounding, or processing of a controlled substance." 
In the instant case, the conduct of the appellant 
which satisfies the definition of production or manufacture 
was his watering of the marijuana plants. However, such 
conduct also fits the definition of possession, for it 
constitutes "maintaining" the plants, at least, and argu-
ably requires the exercise of some degree of "control" or 
"retaining" at the moment that the conduct occurs. Therefore, 
as applied to the facts of this case, the conduct of the 
appellant satisfies both the simple possession statute and 
the production statute, and there is no element of the 
simple possession statute, as applied to his conduct, which 
is not also an element of the production statute. Since 
the evidence could have been found by the jury insufficient 
for the greater but sufficient for the lesser offense, the 
appellant was entitled to an instruction on the lesser 8ffense. 
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IV. THE FAILURE OF THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE 
OFFENSE CHARGED INCLUDED THE ELEMENT OF INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE WAS PH.EJUDICIAL ERROR. 
During the trial, appellant also requested an 
instruction defining the offense as including, as an element 
of the crime, the intent to distribute the controlled sub-
stance. However, the court's instruction on the elements 
of the offense, Instruction No. 6, did not include that 
element as an element of the offense charged. Appellant 
submits that that failure by the court constituted rever-
sible error since the statute under which he was charged, 
Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i), includes as an element the intent 
to distribute or "dispense." 
Section 58-37-8 (1) (a) (i) makes it a felony: 
.To produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to 
possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
'rhe language of subsection (a) (i) is ambiguous as to the 
application of the words "with intent to" to the operative 
words "produce, manufacture or dispense." 
Generally, acts constituting production could 
hardly be viewed as inherently more culpable than those 
constituting possession, especially where production is 
for one's own use and not for sale. Indeed, some states 
have provided by statute that production which is not for 
the purpose of distribution shall not be subject to the 
same penalty as production which is for the purpose of 
distribution, since production for pne's own use is 
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essentially equivalent, in moral culpability, to simple 
possession. (See North Carolina G.S. 90-87(15) and State 
v. Whitted, 205 S.E.2d 611.) In this case, evidence at 
trial showed approximately a dozen plants, the largest of 
which was five inches high. Production or cultivation 
would, in most circumstances, involve possession of the 
substance. 
In light of the fact that simple production for one's 
own use is inherently no more culpable than simple posses-
sion, a misdemeanor offense, the statute prohibiting pro-
duction should be interpreted, if possible, to apply the 
same penalty to simple production as is applied to simple 
possession. Since the Utah statute prohibiting production 
is ambiguous, it can and should be interpreted in such a 
way that production is a felony only if it involves an intent 
to distribute. In other words, Section 58-37-8(1) (a) (i) 
should be read in such a way that one element of production 
under that section, which makes production a felony, is an 
intent to distribute. Simple production, which is inher-
ently a misdemeanor, would be prosecutable under the simple 
possession section, Section 58-37-8(2) (a} (i). 
In the present case, this conclusion mandates the 
result that the appellant was entitled to an instruction 
that the offense for which he was charged, production under 
§58-37-8(1) {a) (i), included the element of intent to dis-
tribute or dispense, since under that section he was subject 
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to a felony penalty. The giving of the court's instruction 
which omitted that element, and the court's failure to give 
the appellant's requested instruction, constituted rever-
sible error, particularly in light of the fact that the 
court also refused to give the appellant's requested instruc-
tion on the lesser included offense of simple possession, 
which would have been appropriate in this case where there 
was no evidence of the appellant's intent to distribute the 
marijuana and which would have been the proper offense to 
charge since the evidence tended to show only simple pro-
duction, inherently a misdemeanor. 
V. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL IN THIS MATTER SINCE 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY A CONVICTION. 
On appeal, the test of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence at trial is whether the evidence presented was suf-
f icient to establish a prima f acie case of every element 
of the crime charged. If there was not enough evidence on 
any element to enable the jury to reach a verdict of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as a matter of law, then a con-
viction must be reversed. 
In the present case, there were several elements 
on which there was not sufficient evidence to enable the 
jury to reach a justifiable verdict. First, in regards tQ 
the element of intent to distribute, as discussed above, 
the State presented no evidence at all concerning the 
appellant's intent to distribute the marijuana in the future. 
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Considering the fact that the appellant was only a guest in 
the house and was only temporarily taking care of the pro-
perty, the only reasonable inference from the evidence as 
as whole was that he had no intent at all regarding the 
future of the marijuana. He could not contemplate having 
control of it in the future, and therefore could not poss-
ibly have had an intent to sell it. 
On the element of knowledge and intention as to the 
conduct of the appellant, it is provided at Section 58-37-8(11) 
that any evidence of production will raise the presumption 
that the suspect acted with knowledge of the character of 
the substance produced. However, such a presumption is 
rebuttable, and is particularly vulnerable under circum-
stances where, as here, it is shown that a suspect is not 
the actual owner of the substance but was, if anything, 
temporarily performing a service. In this case, evidence 
that the appellant was merely visiting the home for the 
purpose of caring for the house and yard was sufficient to 
rebut the statutory presumption that he knew that any of 
the plants were marijuana. In the absence of the presump-
tion, there is nothing in the record, nor in the statements 
of the appellant himself (T.R.44:9-20), that would indicate 
that the appellant had ever seen marijuana before, had been 
told that there was marijuana in the yard, or that he knew 
from any other source that there was marijuana in the plastic 
buckets that he was seen watering. 
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Even more crucial to the question of sufficiency 
of the evidence is the fact that there was no evidence in 
the case establishing to a sufficient moral certainty that 
the plants in the plastic buckets were marijuana. As pointed 
out before, the evidence indicated only that the plants in 
the metal tub were analyzed by an expert and determined to 
be marijuana. Such a finding has no rational connection 
to any other location or object on the premises, unless it 
can somehow be inferred that every potted plant on the 
yard in question was a marijuana plant. The failure of the 
State to present competent evidence that the buckets con-
tained marijuana negates the inference that when he watered 
the plants in the buckets, he was cultivating marijuana. 
Since the evidence was therefore insufficient on 
the elements of the presence of a controlled substance, 
the mental state of the appellant, and the specific intent 
t.o distribute a controlled substance in the future, the 
State failed to present a prima facie case under Section 
58-37-8(1) (a) (i) and the case should not have been sub-
mitted to the jury. To allow the conviction was reversible 
error. 
During the trial, appellant moved to dismiss the 
case on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence on the 
elements of the offense. That motion was denied. The 
appellant respectfully requests that the conviction be 
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reversed on the grounds that that dismissal should properly 
have been granted. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Appellant requests the Court to reverse 
the conviction and judgment entered against the defendant 
in the trial court and remand the case for vacating of 
that judgment. 
DATED this day of April, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1~{A,J~1 
ROBERT J. SCHU~Hi:R ~ 
Attorney for Ap'Pellant 
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